Mises and Scheler
— Two types of value theory and their possible interrelation —

SUNWALL Mark R

Abstract

The concept of value was crucial in the thought of both Ludwig von Mises and Max Scheler, however the spheres to which the concept “value” was applied by each was very different, Mises being an economist and Scheler being a ethicist and philosophical anthropologist. Superficially the positions of the two thinkers seem to be diametrically opposed, Scheler maintaining the validity of “objective values” and Mises championing “subjective value” as the key to understanding economic processes. However it is possible to consider the economic sphere in which subjective values operate as a subset of a much wider frame of reference grounded in objective values. Scheler’s thought points towards an ideal realm which is in no way invalidated by economic analysis of the values which people actually choose. Viewed in this respect the thought of Mises and Scheler may be seen as complementary. This complementarity was not grasped at the time when the two men were contemporaries, due to Mises involvement in tangential methodological concerns. Further factors 1) Scheler’s early death, 2) the Heideggerian obscuration of the early phenomenological movement, 3) the lateness of Scheler’s recognition by American social scientists, and 4) the hardening of disciplinary boundaries between philosophy and the various social sciences, including economics, have tended to diminish the impact of Scheler’s ideas on subsequent thought. None the less, Scheler’s notion of objective value could serve as a unique mediation between the cognitive universe of libertarians and traditionalists respectively. In this respect putting Mises and Scheler in mutual context is a vital desideratum for our times.

Key Words: value theory, economics, ethics, Ludwig von Mises, Max Scheler

Foreign Languages, College of Nursing Art and Science, University of Hyogo
Introduction

The concept of value was crucial in the thought of both Ludwig von Mises and Max Scheler, however the spheres to which the concept “value” was applied by each was very different, Mises being an economist and Scheler being a ethicist and philosophical anthropologist. (1) Superficially the positions of the two thinkers seem to be diametrically opposed, Scheler maintaining the validity of “objective values” and Mises championing “subjective value” as the key to understanding economic processes. However it is possible to consider the economic sphere in which subjective values operate as a subset of a much wider frame of reference grounded in objective values. Scheler’s thought points towards an ideal realm which is in no way invalidated by economic analysis of the values which people actually choose. Viewed in this respect the thought of Mises and Scheler may be seen as complementary. Though a variety of factors have, up to the present, conspired to keep Misesian and Schelerian studies isolated from each other, this paper is intended as a small step in the direction of mutual recognition. (2)

Contemporary Relevance of the Problem

The issue of values is one which has been taken up in popular cultural discourse in America. Thus the expression “values voters” has been coined to designate citizens who vote in response to government policies on moral issues such as abortion, or the prohibition of drugs and certain forms of sexual behavior. In this context “values” is usually a cipher standing for the defense of “traditional values.” Opponents of traditional values state, correctly, that the notion of value generally implies subjective evaluation. Thus advocates of non–traditional lifestyles are expressing their values as clearly as traditionalists do their own.

This semantic confusion ultimately may be traced to the fact that “value” is a term originally borrowed by ethics from economics. Modern economics construes “value” as subjective. Does this imply that any consistent use of the term value by ethicists will ultimately lead to ethical subjectivism, i.e. that all moral preferences are a matter of taste? This is the conclusion drawn by Paul Gottfried in his criticism of the cultural and political use of the term “value” by the American conservative movement. He states that the uncritical substitution of the economic for the social usage of “value” caused a crisis in meaning for the Old (libertarian) Right, and brought about coup d’état by a new (authoritarian) right, which profited from this semantic confusion by inserting a new agenda using the old terms of discourse. (Gottfried 2007)

If the notion of value is inherently ambiguous, then any concept of objective ethical norms would have to be based on some other concept besides values. There are indeed alternatives in the form of categorical imperatives, divine command theory, naturalism etc., but these bases all come with their own drawbacks, they being either forbiddingly transcendent and rigorous, or susceptible to other mischief. The charming quality of an “objective system of values” lies in its combination of autonomous motivation with universal moral ends. Arguably the
most representative system of objective value ethics is the one formulated by phenomenological philosopher Max Scheler.

Here we will not argue directly for the validity of Scheler’s ethics. Rather we will try to remove a major obstacle to understanding his philosophy: a faulty understanding of economics. If the economic concept of value precludes a broader philosophical theory of value ethics, then Scheler’s system is doomed from the start. However it will be demonstrated that this is not the case, for the man who thought most deeply about the epistemological underpinnings of economics, Ludwig von Mises, also went on to show that value is not a specifically economic notion. Rather it belongs to the sphere of psychology, or what Mises called thymology. Mises himself was not an admirer of Scheler’s philosophy, but his understanding of the basis and role of economics within the human sciences does not preclude the possibility of an objective ethics of values. In this respect his thought differs from other, more scientistic, understandings of economics. This compatibility between Misesian and Schelerian thought likewise hints at a possible ground for understanding between, if not fusion of, libertarian and conservative modes of social theory.

The Core argument:
The openness of Misesian economics to philosophical value-theory

Philosophers didn’t always discuss ethical and psychological problems with reference to the term “value.” Value itself was a concept first extensively treated in the literature of economics. (3) In the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries problems of ethics began to be discussed in terms of values, finally coming to fruition in Max Scheler’s elaborate system of value-ethics. (4) However there are always bound to be difficulties when one field borrows a term from another. Is the concept which has been adapted to a new field strictly equivalent to its usage in the field of its origin?

This is especially true with regard to the use of “value” in the fields of ethics and philosophical anthropology. A skeptic might, with justice, point out that use of the term value by ethicists and philosophers differs widely from its use by economists. In the case of Max Scheler’s value-ethics “value” is not only employed in a way different from its economic usage, but is actually diametrically opposed to the way post-Mengerian economics have construed value. Modern (post-1870) economics construes value as the subjective imputation of worth to goods and services. Scheler’s notion of value, on the other hand, inheres to objective worth, notably the worthy ideals elicited by certain types of persons.

Now if the term “value” is no more than a homonym designating two different concepts, there is no conflict which arises from the economic and the philosophical use of the word. Shortly I will demonstrate how this is in fact the case, since once the implications of pure Misesian theory are understood, the two concepts are able go their separate ways in perfect harmony. However this is by no means obvious, as hinted at by the nickname “the worldly philosophers”
used on occasion to designate economists. According to common sense, there would seem to be a fundamental contradiction between the kind of "idealistic" value-theory upheld by Max Scheler which is objective, eternal, and based on moral intuitions and the more "mundane" notion of value which is subjective and concerned with the use of goods and services. From an economist's point of view Scheler's value philosophy would bear an unflattering family resemblance to the obsolescent value theories of Ricardo and other classical economists.

Even Mises himself was apt to dismiss Scheler on precisely this ground, for in one of his rare references to the philosopher, he writes that "[Scheler] was prevented, by his desire to find an absolute determination of the ranks of values, from drawing the conclusions from his answer that are crucial for ethics." (Epistemological Problems of Economics, p.87) It is not clear that Mises delved particularly deeply into the philosophy of Scheler, or that he gave general ethics the same kind of penetrating treatment that he gave to economics. It does seem that he esteemed Scheler as a clear thinker, one who recognized that all behavior, human or animal, was based on eudemonistic (that is, pleasure seeking and pain avoiding) attainment of goals.

However it is this question of eudemonism which lies at the core of the presumed incompatibility between Scheler and economics. In fact, Scheler's value theory is non-eudemonistic, for it posits a devotion to personal exemplars which rises above the simple instincts of pleasure seeking and pain avoidance. While recognizing the universality of basic drives, Scheler maintains the possibility of heroic, even saintly, value affirmation operating on an entirely different level. In this respect it stands in direct contradiction to the psychological premises which are generally presumed to constitute the underpinnings of modern economics. This a misunderstanding of special relevance to the school of Austrian economics, for it is this school which has carried the insights of subjective marginal utility to their most logical conclusions.

Now it would seem that following this theorem (i.e. subjective utility) out in detail would lead to a kind of "calculus of desire" since the actual behavior of people making decisions in the market place involves a trade off between greater desired goods against lesser desired goods. The premises involved in this sort of value calculation precludes any theory such as Scheler's concerning higher values, in so far as such a theory might be offered as a realistic understanding of human nature. If the theory of value calculation is scientific and universal, it must ultimately rest on an equally universal psychology of human drives.

Indeed it was at this point that economic theory had reached prior to Mises. However Mises pointed out, against his forerunners, that there can be no such thing as "value calculation." What we see in markets is price calculation carried out with fiduciary media, not a judging of values or desire. The pre-monetary grounds of these price calculations are not quantifiable psychological facts, rather they are actions establishing logical relations between goods of greater or lesser value at the moment of exchange. The ultimate psychological bases of these actions can only be guessed at, and never quantified.

Thus, in Misesian theory, "value" has no psychological meaning in economics. Although Mises himself never seemed to draw the conclusion, it can be inferred that this usage of value has no
point in conflict with ethical theories of "higher values" including that of Max Scheler. This is not to say that there is any necessary sense in which Miseian economics implies the validity of Schelerian philosophy or vice versa. All that has been, or needs to be, maintained is that there is no inherent contradiction, or even conflict, between the two usages of value. That they might be complementary theories will have to rest on the insights culled from experience rather than deduction. In the conclusion I will adduce some reasons why the wedding of these theories might be salutary for certain political projects, however one further complication will have to be untangled before that summing up.

Valuation not objective or optimal in Mises
and the opening up to "higher values"

Austrians, unlike other economists, do not dwell much on the supposed rationality or optimality of markets. They restrict their defense of free enterprise to an assertion that markets work to get people what they want. They do not assert that people generally know what is best for them or pretend to know what those best things might be. In this way they make room for the ethicist.

The assertion of Scheler is not that the intuitional order of values is clearly seen among the majority of human beings at any given time. Rather he sees this as a function of human genius for valuation. The hierarchy of objective values is not susceptible of logical proof in the ordinary sense of the phrase. However this does not mean that the values of the heart are illogical or arbitrary, rather they are directly perceptible by an intuiting faculty which is rather undeveloped in the mass of humanity. An analogy might be drawn with the more transparent notion of "common sense." Common sense is something which is recognized and often appealed to, however it is also admitted that common sense is less common than foolishness. Likewise there is nothing statistically normative about Scheler’s "ordo amoris." It does not govern the social order so much a lie behind that order, waiting to be discovered by whomever has the moral stamina to do so.

As Guido Hulsman explains

The kernel of Mises' value theory of calculation is this: while calculation in terms of money prices is the essential intellectual tool of entrepreneurs acting in a market economy, calculation in terms of "value" is impossible. A calculus can only be performed with multiples of an extended unit; for example, one can add one apple to another apple or one grain of silver to another grain of silver. In contrast one cannot add a telephone to a piano concerto and still less can one add wittiness to silence. These things are incommensurable and therefore cannot be linked through mathematical operations. So it is with value. One cannot quantify the value of a thing because value is not extensive and therefore not measurable. (Hulsman 2007).
In Misesian economics, as opposed to the psychologistic interpretations of the Austrian school which prevailed from the time of Carl Menger to Friedrich von Wieser, choice replaces value as the most fundamental concept. "Value" simply means that $a$ has been chosen over $b$, and is therefore more highly valued. We cannot say how many times $a$ is more valuable than $b$ at this fundamental level of analysis. In a more developed economy commodities are exchanged against units of some commodity which has been monetized, facilitating exchange while creating the illusion that goods have measurable value in and of themselves. But these quantities are nothing but the outcome of choices, not measures of value, either an objective value of things (as with classical economics) or an intensive measure of some psychological state such as desirability (as in the speculations of the early Austrian school).

This decoupling of economic theory from psychology has a number of profound consequences for philosophy and the social sciences. First it means that psychology is free to ignore any spurious materialist axiology emanating from economics. Economic outcomes in the market place are the result of free, and fallible, choice by human beings. Monetary measures of value in the market place only tell us what large numbers of people find useful and expedient at a certain point in time. Thus the market process is a tool for obtaining values which are reflected in human actions. It cannot be used reflexively to measure values prior to their manifestation through choice.

Recognizing this to be a consequence of his theory, Mises called for the separation of economics and psychology. Indeed, he rejected the word "psychology" which he associated with behaviorism and other quantifying sciences, and proposed its replacement with the term "thymology" to signify the study of human thought through the media of literary exposition. Implicit in this separation is the fact that axiology (the study of values) is also a realm separate from economics. This would be true whether or not axiology was itself a branch of psychology. As a phenomenologist Scheler rejected the notion that values were simply a manifestation of psychological drives.

This parallelism between the anti-psychologism of Mises and of Scheler is no accident. They were in fact both fruits of the same philosophical tree, for as Huslmann writes,

In the mid-nineteenth century, the influential British economist philosopher John Stuart Mill had popularized an empiricist epistemology according to which all sciences were based on some form of experience. In the case of mathematics and economics, this empirical basis was psychological experience. Mill's epistemology was at first very successful in Austria, where it shaped for example the epistemological views of Friedrich von Wieser. But soon a reaction successfully expelled the Millian approach from central Europe. Around the turn of the century two philosophers, Gottlob Frege and Edmund Husserl, published devastating attacks on psychologism in logic as advocated by J.S. Mill. (Hulsmann 2007)

Scheler adopted this anti-psychologism from Husserl, while Mises obtained it from his own insights along with phenomenologically influenced economists such as Schumpeter.
Scheler’s view of “Captialism”

Perhaps the major reason for a lack of mutual appreciation between Mises and Scheler during their lifetimes and among their subsequent respective followings rests in Scheler’s professed anti-capitalism. In contrast to Mises, who’s life mission consisted of showing the indispensability of free markets to free societies, Scheler claimed to be a kind of socialist, albeit of a religious and anti-Marxist stripe. None the less Scheler never involved himself with economics as a technical field, therefore his pronouncements on capitalism have little to do with an understanding of the market process. As such, his “economic” views turn out to be a phenomenological analysis of the contrasting character types of the bourgeois and the proletarian. Not surprisingly, he finds both of them wanting, and both rooted in the same crass materialism of modernity.

Manfred S. Frings does a good job of summing up how Scheler viewed the decline of values as a function of modern materialism.

...Scheler could argue that the decrease in the feeling of life’s values—a decrease expressive of excessive sex and subsequent abortion rates as well as of a lack of respect for sex and subsequent commensurate abstinence—holds in both capitalism and socialism and would therefore point to the common root of the capitalist mind set. Samaritan, selfless love, is neither useful nor profitable in society. It dissolves in the profusion and management of humanitarian love that gives priority to quantifiable values. Society offers little opportunity for practicing selfless Samaritan love of the other. People choose to meet their own needs at the expense of others, leading to widespread greed and lack of responsibility. (Frings 1997)

In such fugitive observations on economics Scheler combines two fallacies which constantly provoked Mises to polemics: historicism and religiously based moralism. Capitalism is supposed to have some how changed human nature, and to have changed it for the worse. However it was Mises himself, no doubt the very archetype of the “bourgeois” economist from Scheler’s point of view, who rejected “homo economicus” as a postulate of philosophical anthropology. In contrast to the older economics of Adam Smith and even Menger, Mises did not see the calculation of utilities as an intrinsic psychological property of human beings. As explained above, for Mises quantification does not apply to values, the calculation of prices being a convenience introduced into the market by the invention of money. A buyer or seller will go into the market and calculate how much a given commodity can be exchanged for in monetary terms. However when that same buyer or seller returns home it will still be impossible to set a quantitative measure on the love he or she bears for each individual in the family. Mises demonstrates the non-commensurable nature of values, as opposed to prices, as an a priori universal. The principle applies equally to all historical epochs and cultures, to the ancient as well as the modern, to the aristocrat and the proletarian as well as the bourgeois.

Fortunately Scheler’s desire to historicize the loveless, calculating bourgeois type is more a symptom of his cultural surroundings than of his essential thought. At heart Scheler is not
a historicist, although his phenomenological philosophy is deeply informed by a knowledge of history. Like Mises he wants to find a measuring rod by which the panorama of historical fact can be assayed and understood. However he flies higher than Mises, who was willing to restrict his labors to the realm of economics. Scheler set out to set forth an ethics which was based on value rather than duty. In this respect he is a philosopher of freedom at heart. He is also deeply concerned with order and hierarchy, not a coerced order of formal obligation, but a hierarchy of ever more eternally valid evaluations. This hierarchy, from highest to lowest, can be set out in schematic form as follows.

1. the value rank of the holy and the unholy
2. the value rank of values of the mind:
   a. juridical values
   b. aesthetic values
   c. values of knowledge
3. the value rank of life-style values: noble — ignoble
4. the value rank of utility values: useful — not useful
5. the value rank of sensible values: comfort — discomfort

(from Frings pp. 29-30)

Now it might be presupposed that the above ranking of values reduces the phenomena typically dealt with by the science of economics to minor significance. However Mises bases economics on the concept of choice rather than preference, while on the contrary Scheler bases his axiology on preference rather than choice. From a Schelerian point of view there is a natural movement of the personality towards preferring higher values. Mises is noncommittal on this, since preferences, prior to their manifestation in choice, are excluded from the science of action (praxiology), which is in turn the foundation of economics. Preferences anterior to choice are banished by Mises to the murky realm of Thymology, which for him is a sort of black box limiting the necessity of economic explanation.

This Misesian self-limitation of economic theory leaves room for, although it by no means implies, the notion of an objective hierarchy of values. Mises himself was not temperamentally inclined to speculate on an objective ethics of values. Indeed, he never decisively broke with utilitarianism, in spite of the fact that his methodological treatises bore Kantian, Aristotelian, and phenomenological influences which were ultimately incompatible with utilitarianism. The most that can be said here is that Mises’ apparent disinterest in Scheler’s work, as opposed to that of the broader phenomenological movement, does not preclude a synthetic appreciation of their thought, especially now that the scholarly corpus of both men is now available in synoptic form.
Conclusion

In the confusion of America’s culture wars libertarians and conservatives have been alternatively friends and enemies, agreeing from time to time on tactical issues, but more often than not divided by profound differences in philosophical orientation. Those libertarians who take their inspiration from the works of the Austrian economists while zealous for economic freedom, more often than not find themselves taking an agnostic position, not just in the theological sense, but towards the basic moral norms of society. (vis. Block 1991) On the other hand social conservatives increasingly find themselves falling back on articles of religious faith when justifying their policy recommendations. Needless to say, such faith-based premises cannot be admitted to the public forum, since the authority of religion becomes odious once it is removed from the sphere of private conscience to that of state policy.

Against these extremes the thought of Max Scheler would seem to provide a possible via media, a world of order based not on compulsion but love. A major difficulty standing in the way of Scheler’s reemergence as an influence in modern social thought is his seeming anti-economism, a stance which would cause many to dismiss him as a romantic utopian. Hopefully this paper has shown that, for those who accept the Misesian turn in economic methodology, there is no necessary contradiction between objective value ethics and the theory of subjective utility as it is taught by the Austrian school of economics. Indeed, Scheler’s notion of objective value could serve as a unique mediation between the cognitive universe of libertarians and traditionalists respectively. In this respect putting Mises and Scheler in mutual context is a vital desideratum for our times.

Notes

(1) As Guido Hulsmann notes, “The term Wert has the same ambivalent meaning in German as its English translation value”—it means value in the qualitative sense but can also mean an exchange ratio on the market.” (Mises: The last knight of Liberalism, p.401)

(2) This compatibility was not grasped by either Mises or Scheler, although the two men were near contemporaries. Mises was more interested in provoking an engagement between his own methodological principles and the work of sociologists such as Max Weber and Alfred Schutz than with pure phenomenology or other philosophical systems. However, given the indebtedness of Schutz to Scheler, it is remarkable that neither Mises, nor any of his students ever gave much thought to the compatibility of Austrian economics with Schelerian value-ethics. Four factors probably contributed to this disconnection. First, Scheler’s early death, which eliminated his very dynamic personal presentation of value-ethics from the view of his contemporaries. Second, the upstaging of the early phenomenological movement by the popularity of Martin Heidegger, who was recognized as the leading philosopher in Germany, if not Europe, upon the death of Scheler. Heidegger’s thinking was vastly different
from Scheler’s, and tended to shift the focus of intellectual discussions from values back to metaphysics. Third, the lateness of Scheler’s recognition by American social scientists. Even though phenomenology attracted the attention of many scholars in the United States, Scheler’s works were translated into English long after that of subsequent thinkers, notably Alfred Schutz. Finally, the hardening of disciplinary boundaries between philosophy and the various social sciences, including economics, tended to diminish the impact of Scheler’s ideas on subsequent thought.

Economics was the first science to investigate the source of value. Originally value was assumed to be a natural property of objects. From the time of Adam Smith objects were considered to exchange at some ratio equivalent to the value of the factors of production which had gone into their respective manufacture. Reflecting the concerns of the early industrial age, David Ricardo felt that it was natural resources, worked up through different stages into the form of capital goods, which explained differences in value, with higher stages of production adding further and further layers of value on top of previous factors. An opposing theory of objective value was proposed by Karl Marx. In Marxian theory the value of a commodity was ultimately based on the quantity of labor required to produce it.

The labor theory has continued as a self-referential paradigm in Marxian studies, but the classical theories of Smith and Ricardo floundered on an inability to relate value to utility. Why, for example, was very useful water less costly than relatively useless diamonds? This difficulty was solved with the emergence of subjective utility theory. Carl Menger, Léon Walras, and Stanly Jevons almost simultaneously (c. 1870) hit on the notion that the marginal unit of a stock was the one that set the price. Henceforth the values of classes of commodities considered in the aggregate were no longer considered to be commensurable. Rather, relative evaluations by minds operating under conditions of scarcity were seen as the driving force behind the price structure.

In the wake of this methodological revolution it seemed on the surface that economics had managed to reform its methodology on the basis of psychology. It took two generations of familiarity with the tools of neoclassicism before it was understood that subjectivism did not imply psychologism. This realization, which only gained ground with the students of Menger, led to the “radical” or “pure” theory of subjective utility, which is better known today as the “Austrian school” since its leading proponents originally taught in Vienna. Menger himself used the term “subjective value” rather than subjective utility, which in contrast to the latter usage (favored by Walras and Jevons) emphasized the choice aspect over the desire aspect of weighing relative goods. However Mises pursued this line of thought even further, by eventually dropping the term value altogether. Mises realized that value still retained the connotation of something that might be submitted to quantitative measure, as in an “intense” valuation. Because he wanted to found the quantitative phenomena of economics (i.e., prices) on something more fundamental, namely the non-quantitative basis of either-or choices, he reformulated the basis of Austrian economics on the postulate of action rather
than value.

Two things should be carefully noted about this reformulation or "Copernican revolution" of Austrian economics after Mises. First, as has been noted in this paper, it disambiguates the field of economics from that of value ethics. Thus, as I have pointed out, it precludes rivalry between these fields and ensures their relative autonomy *vis a vis* one another. However it should also be understood that the autonomy of economics provided by the "action axiom" is not absolute. Perhaps it is a bit disingenuous of Austrian economists to speak of human action as an "axiom" at all, because it is not an axiom in the sense that one speaks of them in mathematics, i.e. self-subsisting postulates. Rather, as Mises himself stated in *Theory and History*, action arises out of an unseen process of deliberation, which is the subject of psychology (in Mises' terminology "thymology"). Thus the immediate basis of economics (human action) emerges out of an anterior foundation subsisting within human nature itself, namely the human mind. For Mises economics does not just float in the air, for all its clarity it rests on the ambiguous workings of the psyche, both conscious and unconscious. In their resistance to axiomatization of economic methodology, the "hermeneutic" sub-school of Austrian economics is probably closer to the spirit of Mises than the others. Unfortunately, from the point of view expressed in this paper, the Hermenetic Austrian school has tended to supplement its economics with theories derived from Hans George Gadmer, a pupil of Heidegger, rather than the more rational and ethical thought of Max Scheler.

(4) Philosophy started to take up the study of value as a modernist reaction to the grand metaphysical systems of German Idealism. Thus Hermann Lotz tried to improve on these systems by showing how ideas were either valuable or indifferent to the mind, an approach that he felt was more compatible to the development of the sciences than the objective idealism of Hegel and Schelling. However it was the radical "transvaluation of values" initiated by Nietzsche which truly popularized value-philosophy, in so far as it called forth alternatives, and more scholarly defense of traditional values. With the phenomenology of Husserl, a non-positivist methodology for the investigation of values seemed to be ready at hand, and it was with this method, after his first training with Rudolph Eucken (a holistic eclectic) that Scheler independently embarked on his investigations. After Scheler's death interest in the ethics of values gradually declined, due to the revived interest in the metaphysics of Heidegger others (vis.Marias), but in recent years Scheler's thought has be receiving renewed attention (vis.Frings, Spader).
Bibliography

Block, Walter
Defending the Undefendable Fox & Wilkes San Francisco : 1991

Frings, Manfred S.
The Mind of Max Scheler Marquette University Press Milwaukee : 1997

Gottfried, Paul

Hulsmann, Jorg Guido
Mises : The Last Knight of Liberalism
Ludwig von Mises Institute Auburn AL : 2007

Marias, Julian

Mises, Ludwig von
Epistemological Problems of Economics Ludwig von Mises Institute Auburn AL : 2003

Mises, Ludwig von
Human Action Fox & Wilks San Francisco : 1949

Mises, Ludwig von
Socialism Liberty Fund Indianapolis : 1981

Scheler, Max
Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values Northwestern University Press Evanston IL : 1973

Scheler, Max
On Feeling, Knowing, and Valuing Chicago Press Chicago : 1992

Schutz, Alfred
The Phenomenology of the Social World Northwestern University Press Evanston IL : 1967

Schnadelbach, Herbert

Spader, Peter H.
ミーベスとシェーラー
——価値理論の2つのタイプ、その相互関係について——

サンワル マーク R

要　旨
価値（英value、独Wert）の概念は、ルートヴィヒ・フォン・ミーベスとマックス・シェーラーの思想においても重要な役割を負っていた。もちろん「価値」の概念が各人によって適用される領域は異なっていた。ミーベスは経済学者であり、シェーラーは倫理学者・哲学の人間学者であった。表面上、二人の思想家の立場は完全に対立しているように見える。シェーラーは「客観的価値」の真理性を主張したのに対して、ミーベスは経済的選択のプロセスを理解するためにの鍵として「主観的価値」を擁護したからだ。しかし、主観的価値が作用する経済の領域を、客観的価値に根ざしたはるかに広い論究の枠組みの部分集合とみなすことは可能である。シェーラーの思想が指向しているのは或る理念的な人間世界であるが、その世界は人びとが実際に選択する諸価値観を経済的に分析することによって千々万々にされたりはしない。この点にかんがみれば、ミーベスとシェーラーの思想は相補的な関係にあると言えよう。二人が同時代を生きた当時この相補性が理解されなかったのは、ミーベスが本筋から離れた法方論的仕事に関わっていたことによる。さらにつぎのような諸要因、
①　シェーラーの早世、
②　ハイデガーの影響によって初期の現象学運動が見えにくくなったこと、
③　米国の社会学者がシェーラーを知ったが遅かったこと、
④　経済学を含めた社会科学と哲学とのあいだの学間的縁張り意識が強固であったこと。
などによって、後代の思想に対してシェーラーの考えがもっともいた衝撃力が弱められがちだったのだ。
それにもかかわらず、客観的価値についてのシェーラーの考え方は、リバタリアンと伝統的保守主義者のそれぞれの世界観を橋渡しするユニークな媒体として役立つであろう。この点に関してミーベスとシェーラーを共通の文脈においてみることは、現代にとって必要不可欠な作業である。

キーワード：価値論、経済学、ルートヴィヒ・フォン・ミーベス、マックス・シェーラー